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This chapter examines trading costs that are associated with the “costs of exchanging 
ownership titles”. Costs are categorized as (i) commission charges which are determined by 
the exchange and (ii) cost components of the bid-ask spread that are determined by market 
participants. There are three main components of the bid-ask spread. The order processing 
cost which is associated with the cost of providing liquidity, the inventory cost that is due to 
short-term order imbalances and the adverse selection cost that refers to the cost of trading 
with informed traders. Spreads and commission charges are currently at very low levels in 
developed markets which have led to a great expansion in algorithm trading and trading 
volume. Trading costs for emerging markets appear to be considerably higher than for the 
more developed markets. Market capitalisation and liquidity differences explain some of the 
variability in trading costs in exchanges around the world. A second element of variability is 
attributed to differences in market structures.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the market microstructure literature, the majority of research is concentrated on or related 
to the existence of transaction costs, and in particular to the origins and determinants of the 
bid-ask spread. The seminal work on bid-ask spread costs is by Demsetz (1968) hence it is 
only fair to start this chapter with the original definition of transaction costs. Demsetz (1968) 
defined transaction costs as the “cost of exchanging ownership titles”, which is further 
reduced to the bid-ask spread and commission charges when all the costs of issuing the 
titles and the costs of being informed about the titles have been incurred.  
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Recent evidence suggests that commission charges are currently at historically all-
time-low levels, which is mainly an outcome of two major changes in financial markets: the 
move to decimal pricing and market consolidation have led to increases in the economies of 
scale in the cost of handling orders (see Stoll, 2006). A study on commission costs by Jones 
(2002) shows that commission costs on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) amount at 
about 0.12% of the amount transacted, down from about 24% in 1994. Historically, until 
1974, commission charges in the U.S. have been linear in nature. That is, commission 
charges increased proportionately with trade size, however, the deregulation of commission 
charges of 1974 led to economies of scale in commission costs. Similarly, trading costs that 
are associated with the existence of the bid-ask spread have declined substantially (see 
Chung et al., 2004 and Stoll, 2000).  
The decline in trading costs has led to a substantial increase in trading volume but 
most importantly has opened the way for the widespread implementation of algorithm 
trading, which refers to computerised trade strategies that rely on heavy volume to extract 
marginal profits from a very large number of trades. In 2009, High Frequency Trading (HFT) 
firms accounted for approximately 2% of the total number of trading firms, however they 
were responsible for almost 75% of the total trading volume in the U.S., approximately a 
threefold increase from 2006 (Iati, 2009). 
A question that naturally arises regarding aggregate trading costs is, why does the 
bid-ask spread exist? Early studies on this field have shown that spreads reflect the price of 
“immediacy” (Demsetz, 1968). Traders that wish to sell (buy) an asset now have no 
guarantee that a buyer (seller) will be available in the market, hence buyers (sellers) will only 
agree to trade if they are compensated for the immediate provision of their services. In this 
context, the spread reflects order processing costs. A second spread component arises 
when factoring in the total inventory costs that are associated with the fact that trade 
imbalances occur over a trading period (see Smidt, 1971). Finally, a third cost component 
arises when incorporating the fact that market participants have asymmetric information, 
hence traders that choose to trade with informed traders effectively provide liquidity at a 
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cost. In order to recover these costs, market participants charge the spread to liquidity 
traders (see Bagehot, 1971).  
The above decomposition of spreads to order processing, inventory and adverse 
selection costs, has explained trading cost variability in relation to market participants. A 
second level of variability is further explained when looking at differences in market 
structures. Studies have shown that even when controlling for firm-level and market liquidity 
differences, trading cost differences across exchanges around the world can be attributed to 
market structure differences (see Jain, 2003).  Studies have shown that electronic trading 
systems enhance liquidity by reducing trading costs, however, floor-based trading systems 
have been shown to provide smaller costs for large institutional trades. Similarly, costs fell 
substantially with the introduction of decimal pricing in the US (see Bessembinder, 2003). 
 
WHY DOES THE BID-ASK SPREAD EXIST? 
Order Processing Costs 
Demsetz (1968) refers to the bid-ask spread as the “price of immediacy” and traces its 
origins to the problem of simultaneity in buying and selling securities. In particular, a trader 
wishing to buy an asset has no guarantee that a seller will be readily available in the market 
to provide this service. A trader who is able to provide this service to the buyer will only 
agree to sell the asset at a price greater than the price the trader has paid to buy this asset. 
Also, a seller who wishes to sell an asset immediately will agree to wait and sell at a future 
date only if the trader is compensated for waiting to trade at a future date. Similarly, a trader 
wishing to sell an asset has no guarantee that there will be a buyer available in the market, 
hence the trader who is available to provide this service immediately will have to be 
compensated for providing this service and a buyer who stands ready to buy an asset will 
have to be compensated for the cost of waiting to buy at a future date. In this respect, the 
bid-ask spread exists as the “price of immediacy”.  If buy and sell orders arrived 
simultaneously the market would clear at the equilibrium price and a spread would not exist. 
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That is, traders conduct two transactions, one at the ask and one at the bid price, instead of 
one if the simultaneity problem did not exist.   
In a limit order market, the price of immediacy is reflected in the limit order book: 
traders wishing to trade at a later time will post limit orders, traders wishing to trade 
immediately will submit market orders. In this respect, ask and bid prices will not carry any 
extra charges apart from commission costs. In a dealer market, dealers (or specialists) will 
not only facilitate the matching of buyers with sellers (assuming a small commission) but 
most importantly have an obligation to “trade against the flow”, that is a dealer also trades for 
his own account hence the spread also reflects the dealer’s income.  The original paper by 
Demsetz (1968) shows that 40% of the total transaction cost of stocks trading at the NYSE 
reflects the spread component and 60% of the total transaction costs is commission 
charges.  
   
Inventory Costs 
To the extent that bid and ask prices reflect the price of immediacy, the spread primarily 
consists of order processing (or immediacy) and commission costs.  However, subsequent 
studies have shown that dealers are not to be seen as risk neutral as far as their inventory 
control is concerned. Smidt (1971) argued that dealers’ requirement to provide liquidity is 
often in disagreement with their goal of profit maximisation, which is conditional on the 
assumption that dealers will not go bankrupt or fail.  Garman (1976) rationalised this idea 
further. In Garman’s (1976) model, the dealers’ optimisation problem is modelled as a series 
of independent buy and sell orders that come at irregular times at specified arrival 
probabilities. Under these conditions, dealers will not only adjust spreads but also bid and 
ask prices in order to make sure that the probability of bankruptcy does not equal one. For 
example, dealers will decrease their bid price when they do not want to increase their 
inventory further (see also Madhavan, 2000). Several papers also emphasize the notion that 
the dealer’s inventory control problem causes a deterioration of dealer’s optimal inventory 
positions hence spreads exist in order to make up for the anticipated losses incurred from 
5 
 
assuming unnecessary risk (see Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980).  A second 
deviation from Garman’s (1978) risk neutral model comes in Ho and Stoll (1981) and in 
O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) amongst others. In Ho and Stoll (1981), a dealer’s expected 
utility of terminal wealth is maximised by adjusting bid and ask prices through time, hence 
bid and ask prices are a function of trade size, stock price volatility, dealer’s time horizon and 
the risk aversion coefficient. O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) show that inventories affect both the 
size and the placement of dealers’ spreads and also that risk averse dealers will set different 
spreads to risk neutral dealers. 
 
Adverse Selection Costs 
Alongside these two streams of literature, a third class of models emerged which was based 
on the notion that truly informed traders may exist in the market in the sense that there are 
three types of traders, liquidity traders, dealers and informed traders and that both classes of 
liquidity and dealer traders possess less information than the informed traders (Bagehot, 
1971; Logue, 1975; Jaffee and Winkler, 1976). These models conclude that even under 
competitive dealer markets with risk neutral dealers, spreads will exist reflecting an adverse 
selection cost component of the spread. In Copeland and Galai’s (1983) adverse selection 
cost model, the dealer sets spreads that maximize his profits. However, with the inclusion of 
liquidity and informed traders, if the spread is too wide, the dealer faces losing profits from 
limited trading with liquidity traders and if the spread is too narrow, the dealer faces the risk 
of losses from the informed traders. The model’s main prediction is consistent with the 
adverse selection theory of the spread: dealers will always set an ask price as a mark-up 
from the true equilibrium price and a bid price as a mark-down from the equilibrium price.  
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) further improved this model by addressing its static 
nature, whereby transaction prices are informative, which results in declining spread 
patterns. Nevertheless, the main predictions of the adverse selection theory remain, namely 
that the spread is a function of the adverse selection cost and that the spread would still 




MEASURES OF BID-ASK SPREAD AND OTHER TRADING COSTS 
Commission Charges 
The above section establishes the three main components of the trading costs; the order 
processing cost, the inventory cost and the adverse selection cost. A fourth component 
refers to commission charges, however, one important difference between the trading costs 
that are reflected by the existence of the bid-ask spread and commission costs is the fact 
that spread costs are determined by market participants acting independently whereas 
commission charges are determined by the exchange (Demsetz, 1968). Of course, the 
minimum spread cost is also a function of the minimum price increment, if such a rule 
applies at the exchange. 
Historically, commission charges have been very volatile. Jones (2002) tracks the 
evolution of commission costs for NYSE stocks over the period 1925-2000. The author 
shows that, between 1925 and 1975, when all commissions were heavily regulated and no 
commission discounts were allowed, one-way proportional commission charges rose from 
0.27 % in 1925 to 0.90 % in 1974. Since the exchange deregulation of commission costs, 
spreads continued to decline by about half every seven or eight years (see Jones, 2002). 
Stoll (2006) shows that the technological advances with the increased use of 
electronic trading have substantially reduced the cost of handling orders by broker-dealers 
even further, hence commission charges are at very low levels. Stoll (2006) reports that the 
average round-trip commission as percentage of public dollar volume for shares trading in 
the U.S. has decreased from 1.17% in 1980 to 0.21% in 2001. Also, Jones and Lipson 
(2001) show that one-way institutional commissions for U.S. stocks listed on the NYSE 
amounted to about 0.12% of the amount transacted, down from 0.24% in 1994 (see  Keim 
and Madhavan, 1997 and Jones, 2002). 
 
Measuring Bid-Ask Spreads 
Assuming that commission charges remain constant over a short time period, the variability 
in trading costs will reflect the existence of the bid-ask spread and the deviation that the 
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spread reflects between the “true” equilibrium price and the bid and ask prices. This 
difference between the “true” price and the trading price is referred to as the trade execution 
cost. The simplest measure of implied execution costs is the quoted spread, which is usually 
denoted in percentage basis points. The quoted spread of a stock is calculated as the ratio 
of quoted spread (ask – bid) over the quote midpoint. Quoted spreads are calculated on an 
intraday basis, usually at fixed time intervals, and several studies have shown an intraday U-
shaped pattern in the quoted spread (see Chan et al., 1995). However, quoted spreads are 
only implicit measures of execution costs, as they do not refer to the actual traded price. A 
second, explicit measure of trading costs is the effective bid-ask spread, which is estimated 
as the ratio of the absolute difference between the traded price and the quote midpoint over 
the quote midpoint (see Huang and Stoll, 2001). In markets where trade negotiations are 
allowed, the effective spread also reflects trade improvements as traders are permitted to 
trade “inside” the quotes, hence the effective spread tends to be lower than the quoted 
spread. A second measure of implicit trading costs is the price impact which measures 
adverse selection costs, that is the costs of trading with an informed trader (see Stoll, 2006; 
Bessembinder, 1999). Price impact costs are measured as the percentage difference 
between the midquote that prevailed at the time of the trade and a future midquote. A final 
measure of transaction costs is the realised spread which is estimated as the difference 
between the effective spread and price impact. As the realised spread is net of the price 
impact, it reflects trading costs net of any losses to informed traders.   
Stoll (2000) shows that the average quoted half-spread for stocks trading on the 
NYSE is 7.87 cents per share and the average effective half-spread is 5.58. Nevertheless, 
Chung et al. (2004) show that effective (quoted) spreads on the NYSE fell by approximately 
40 (36)% following the implementation of decimal pricing in 2001 (see later section on 
decimal vs. fractional pricing).  
Further, several papers show that it possible to infer the order processing, inventory 
and adverse selection components of the bid-ask spread from actual quote and trade data 
(the early literature includes Stoll, 1989; Huang and Stoll, 1997; Roll, 1984; Glosten and 
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Harris, 1988; Ho and Stoll, 1981; Madhavan and Smidt, 1991). As predicted by the 
theoretical analysis of the spread components, Lin et al. (1995) show that the order 
processing cost component exhibits economies of scale, hence it decreases with increases 
in trade size. Also, the adverse selection component increases with increases of trade size. 
Stoll (1989) shows that while spreads vary across stocks, the relative contribution of the 
components of the spread remain unchanged, hence the author estimates that the quoted 
spread consists of adverse selection costs (0.43%), order processing costs (0.47%) and 
inventory holding costs (0.10%). Boehmer (2005) shows that post-reform effective spreads 
for NYSE and NASDAQ stocks are $0.062 and $0.088 respectively. Also, the realised 
spread measures range from $0.035 for NASDAQ stocks to $0.011 for NYSE stocks. A 
comprehensive study of spread differences of exchanges around the world is presented by 
Jain (2003). The author shows that the NYSE has the lowest percentage quoted spread 
(0.20) amongst a sample of 51 exchanges. Spreads of emerging markets are considerably 
higher; Ukraine has the highest percentage quoted spread with 15.34%. A large proportion 
of cross-market spread variability is explained by market capitalisation and institutional 
design differences.  
 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND TRADING COSTS 
Tick size, discreteness and trading costs 
One important question regarding trading costs is what would be the “true” quoted and 
effective spread if the tick size was absent? The tick size refers to the minimum permitted 
price variation on an exchange. On the NYSE, the current minimum tick size is $0.01, which 
was implemented on January 2001. The discrete nature of prices has long been considered 
as a major impediment to reducing transaction costs. Also, apart from the cost of trading in 
discrete prices, a second cost is added on trade prices when trades choose to trade in a set 
of prices that is smaller than the minimum set of prices allowed. This second feature of the 
trading process refers to price clustering and is usually associated with a reduction in 
negotiation costs, price uncertainty or round number preferences (see Harris, 1991, Ball et 
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al., 1985 and Goodhart and Curcio, 1991). Harris (1999) predicts that a reduction in the 
minimum tick size will generally lead to a narrowing of the quoted and effective spread, a 
reduction of market depth (the number of shares that are available for each stock) and 
increase in price improvements as stepping ahead of other trades becomes cheaper under a 
smaller tick size.  
The way in which price clustering and discreteness increase trading costs is 
presented in Hasbrouck (1999). In this study, the spread components are consecutively 
added on the “true” price. Thus, the permanent price (ask or bid) component follows a 
random walk, and the dealer’s ask or bid price is the sum of the permanent price component 
plus a stochastic component that encompasses adverse selection, inventory and order 
processing costs. Translating these costs to quoted bids and asks entails rounding them up 
or down to the nearest discrete minimum tick. In a subsequent model, Ball and Chordia 
(2001) show that the “true” quoted spreads that would result in the market in the absence of 
minimum tick regulations vary from 11% to 24% of the “discrete” quoted spread. For 
example, the authors show that for a stock that is quoted at a spread of $0.20, the “true” 
spread varies from $0.02 to $0.06. 
 
Spread Clustering and the Opportunity for Collusion in Dealer Markets  
One important implication of the minimum tick rule was the assertion that NASDAQ market 
makers may have implicitly colluded in order to maintain wide spreads. Smidt (1971) 
rationalized the idea that a market with competing market makers would result in narrow 
spreads and that was the expectation for NASDAQ, a dealer market. Christie and Schultz 
(1994) compare spreads for a sample of 100 of the most actively traded firms listed on 
NASDAQ with a sample of firms listed on NYSE and the American Exchange (AMEX). At the 
time of the study, the minimum tick size was one-eighth of a dollar and Christie and Schultz 
(1994) show that for 70 of 100 NASDAQ firms the absence of odd-eights implies a minimum 
spread of two-eighths or $0.25. In contrast to NASDAQ firms, spreads of firms with similar 
trade characteristics listed on NYSE or AMEX are uniformly distributed across the full range 
10 
 
of eighths. The allegation that NASDAQ market makers implicitly colluded to maintain high 
trading costs was further reinforced by the findings of Christie et al. (1994) that upon the 
publication of the findings of Christie and Schultz (1994) effective spreads in NASDAQ fell by 
approximately 50%. Christie and Schultz (1999) further show that market makers that use 
odd-eighths are much more likely to offer spreads of one-eighth hence bringing costs down. 
Bessembinder (1997) decompose spreads to order processing, adverse selection and 
inventory costs. The author reports that realized spreads, spreads net of adverse selection 
costs, on NASDAQ are positively related with price rounding practices of market makers. 
The same finding is not supported for a sample of same-size matched NYSE stocks that 
strengthens the collusion hypothesis for NASDAQ stocks. 
The “collusion hypothesis” had overarching effects for trading cost and price 
clustering studies across the world (see Ahn et al., 2005 and Chiao and Wang, 2009).  Dutta 
and Madhavan (1997) investigate the conditions under which market makers could have 
implicitly colluded, that is the conditions that would still result to spreads above competitive 
levels without however the explicit agreement of market makers (see also Kandel and Marx, 
1997). The results have important implications for market design, supporting the argument 
that a smaller tick size should lead to more competitive spreads. Godek (1996) shows that 
preference trading, the regulation that allows market makers to direct orders to the market 
makers with the best trade price instead of the market maker with the best quote price, 
provides no incentives to market makers to offer competitive quote prices as almost all 
trades are preference trades in the sense that the terms of trade, including the trade price, 
are agreed prior to the trade. Thus, in this case, spreads are no longer an effective measure 
of trading costs and NASDAQ rules make sure that trading takes place at the best trade 
price. Hansch et al. (1999) show that preferenced trades on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) receive worse execution costs than non-preferenced trades. Also, internalized trades, 
trades that are submitted by a broker to a market maker of the same firm, receive better 
execution costs than non-internalized trades. Similarly, Bernhardt et al. (2005) show that 
execution costs are strongly influenced by the relationship between brokers and dealers, 
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hence brokers that trade consecutively with the same dealer tend to receive greater price 
improvements and smaller execution costs. These findings support the hypotheses that 
there is a cost to negotiating quotes and also that broker-to-market maker relationships have 
important implications for trading costs. Simaan et al. (2003) show that market makers are 
more likely to offer narrow spreads when they can do so anonymously, emphasizing the 
benefits of increased competition for market maker quotation behaviour.  
 
Market Structure Changes and Trading Costs 
The effect of competition and regulation on trading costs 
From 1997, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) allowed limit orders to 
compete with market maker quotes on NASDAQ. In particular, the “limit order display rule” 
that became effective in June 1997 required that limit orders that are better than the quotes 
submitted by market makers would be allowed on NASDAQ hence abandoning the 
monopoly of market makers to post quotes. The second SEC rule required market makers to 
publicise their best bid and ask quotes. Both actions intended to create greater market 
transparency and enhanced competition. In a similar natural experiment, Foerster and 
Karolyi (1998) show a fall in  trading costs for firms that decide to list in multiple markets. 
Chung and Van Ness (2001) investigate the effect of the implementation of the order 
handling rules on trading costs. The authors show that trading costs fell substantially 
following the implementation of the rules. However, subsequent studies by Bessembinder 
(1999) and Chung et al. (2002) which compare post-reform trading costs for NASDAQ and 
NYSE stocks show that trading costs continue to be higher at NASDAQ than at the NYSE. In 
particular, Bessembinder (1999) reports that quoted spreads are 0.78 (1.03)% of share price 
on the NYSE (NASDAQ) and spreads are narrower on the NYSE for 77% of firms with equal 
trade characteristics.  
Electronic vs. open outcry market structures 
An important development in market microstructure has been the introduction of electronic 
trading which in most cases replaced the trading floors. The abandonment of the open 
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outcry and the introduction of electronic trading has given rise to a series of studies that 
investigate to what extent trading costs were affected by this shift. Aitken et al. (2004) 
investigate the natural experiment of the introduction of electronic trading systems at the 
LSE, the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE). 
Aitken et al. (2004) show that trading costs fell significantly under the electronic trading 
system, a finding that is consistent for all three exchanges and holds even after controlling 
for volatility and trading volume effects. However, the authors also report that costs under 
the floor trading system were less prone to volatility spikes, hence under the electronic 
trading system, spreads tend to widen much faster in very volatile periods. Tse and Zabotina 
(2001) further show that trades submitted under an electronic trading system tend to be 
more susceptible to inventory cost considerations and tend to have a smaller information 
content than trades executed in the open outcry market (see also Huang, 2004). In the 
Foreign Exchange (FX) market, Ding and Hiltrop (2010) investigate the transfer of FX 
services from phone-based technology to electronic brokers systems. Ding and Hiltrop 
(2010) show that spreads narrowed after the introduction of electronic trading systems. 
However, spreads of informed traders increased, a finding that is related to an increase in 
market transparency. Finally, an excellent review of how the electronic trading has altered 
the U.S. stock markets is offered by Stoll (2006). The author decomposes costs to three 
components, commission costs, trading losses that reflect adverse selection costs and bid-
ask spreads. Stoll (2006) notes that all three cost components have been reduced with the 
introduction of electronic trading as there has been a decrease in order handling costs, an 
increase in economies of scale and firm consolidations.  The spread changes are significant 
even after controlling for the effect of tick size decreases and the introduction of stricter rules 
that enhanced competition and reduced the opportunities for excess market maker profits 
(see previous section on price clustering).     
Decimal vs. fractional pricing 
In January and April 2001 respectively, the NYSE and NASDAQ replaced the fractional 
pricing system with decimal pricing. This also implied a substantial reduction in tick size. 
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Several “before vs. after” studies show that post-decimalisation spreads have been 
dramatically reduced for both markets (see Bacidore et al., 2003 and NYSE, 2001). 
Bessembinder (2003) report that two important measures of trading costs exhibit significant 
improvement following decimalisation for the NYSE: effective spreads dropped substantially 
and price improvements, the tendency of stepping ahead of other quotes, significantly 
increased. For NASDAQ, effective and quoted spreads dropped, however price 
improvement rates did not improve as NASDAQ’s rule allows traders to circumvent the price 
time priority rules by pre-arranging trades.  Overall, Bessembinder (2003) shows that trade 
execution costs are quite similar for like-for-like stocks trading on NASDAQ and the NYSE. 
Further, ap Gwilym et al. (2005) show a widening in spreads, measured in ticks, following 
the introduction of decimal prices in the UK Long Gilt market. Such a result is anticipated if 
the new tick size is larger than the effective tick size. Nevertheless, ap Gwilym et al. (2005) 
show that the monetary value of spreads dropped significantly after the introduction of 
decimal prices which reflects an overall improvement in trading costs. 
 
Trading Mechanisms and Trading Costs 
Exchanges across the globe operate on a set of trading mechanisms that govern how orders 
are communicated and executed, the minimum tick regulations and the role of different 
market participants. In dealer markets, dealers “make the market” in the sense that investors 
buy and sell at the dealer’s ask and bid price respectively. In an auction or limit order market, 
investors buy and sell from standing limit orders. In hybrid auction markets, liquidity is also 
facilitated by specialists or dealers. Regarding the differences between auction and dealer 
markets, several issues regarding market transparency and market liquidity arise, however 
the most important factor of market quality is execution costs. Several studies focus on this 
latter aspect of market quality vs. market structure.  Christie and Huang (1994) study trading 
costs for firms that decided to move from NASDAQ, a dealer market, to NYSE or AMEX, two 
auction markets. The authors show that firms receive on average a net execution cost gain 
of 4.7 and 5.2 cents per share for the NYSE and AMEX respectively. These cost savings are 
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persistent and generally attributed to liquidity enhancements for small stocks that are 
established on the NYSE and AMEX but not on NASDAQ. Huang and Stoll (1996) further 
decompose cost differences between NYSE and NASDAQ. They show that spread 
differences between the two markets cannot be attributed to differences in adverse selection 
costs, hence the realized spread components of stocks trading on NASDAQ and the NYSE 
are the same. Instead, Huang and Stoll (1996) argue that the absence of a limit order book 
and interdealer trading, such as internalisation and preferencing, are to be associated with 
the higher costs observed on NASDAQ. Heidle and Huang (2002) extend the sample of 
Christie and Huang (1994) by including stocks that decide to move from AMEX or the NYSE 
to NASDAQ. The authors show that firms moving to NASDAQ exhibit wider spreads (see 
also Clyde et al., 1997), most important however is the finding that the greater execution 
costs on NASDAQ are clearly associated with a higher probability of encountering informed 
traders on a dealer market setting. In this respect, trading costs and the implied probability of 
informed trading (as opposed to the explicit adverse selection component of the spread) are 
clearly related.  Venkataraman (2001) compared matched samples of stocks trading on 
Paris Bourse, an automated limit order market with no specialists, and the NYSE. The 
results show that firms with similar trading characteristics tend to exhibit higher transaction 
costs on Paris Bourse even after controlling for adverse selection and economic cost 
differences. These findings show a clear distinction between a hybrid and a fully-automated 
order-book system. Most importantly, however, Venkataraman (2001) shows that hybrid 
markets are able to absorb large trades without a significant movement in price and also the 
human participation is more effective in reducing (transitory) volatility shocks. 
An important question regarding trading costs is to what extent differences in market 
structure may be associated with differences in trading costs. Most of the studies that are 
concerned with market structure differences take one of the following two approaches: the 
“before vs. after” studies look at how trading costs change after the implementation of a new 
policy e.g. a decrease in the minimum tick or the implementation of new order handling rules 
(see Bessembinder, 1999 and Chung et al. 2002). The “A market vs. B market” studies focus 
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on comparing stocks from two different exchanges, usually matched on trading 
characteristics (see Bessembinder, 1997 and Venkataraman, 2001). However, a third set of 
studies looks at differences in trading costs of dual-listed firms hence controlling for firm-
specific characteristics. An early theoretical work in this area is conducted by Chowdhry and 
Nanda (1991). The authors model the informational efficiency of stocks that trade in multiple 
locations, showing that informed traders choose where to trade on the basis of fixed and 
informational costs. The latter finding implies that the market containing the larger pool of 
liquidity traders will dominate all other markets and will attract the largest portion of informed 
trading. Huang and Stoll (2001) consider a set of firms that trade on both the LSE and the 
NYSE. The authors show that the average quoted spread as a percent of quote midpoint is 
1.09% for the LSE and 0.64% for the NYSE. Similarly, the effective spread as a percent of 
quote midpoint is 0.60% for the LSE and 0.46% for the NYSE. Consistent with the 
predictions of Harris (1999), Huang and Stoll (2001) show that the LSE exhibits greater 
depth.  
Block trading 
Block trades have received particular attention in the literature. This has been for two main 
reasons: first, block trades may potentially reveal private information and second the price 
impact of block trades is larger than the price impact of smaller, retail trades (see Seppi, 
1990). Several studies show that institutional traders receive substantial discounts on 
commission costs (see Edmister, 1978, and Edmister and Subramaniam, 1982, Brennan et 
al., 1988). Markets with an off-order book trading facility (also known as upstairs markets) 
are the preferred trading venue for large trades. The increased trade transparency that an 
upstairs market offers protects dealers from adverse selection costs, hence reducing 
execution costs for block trades that otherwise would have to be traded on the order book. 
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) study the upstairs market of the Paris Bourse. 
Their results show that on average block trades executed upstairs are executed with 20% of 
the total execution costs had these trades been executed on the limit order book. These 
discounts largely come from tapping into hidden liquidity pools, a feature which would have 
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been impossible for an order book market. In a similar study for the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE), Smith et al. (2001) show that large block trades receive discounts (price 
improvements) when executed upstairs and the information content of these trades is much 
lower than the information content of trades executed on the order book. Further, Smith et al. 
(2001) report that the upstairs market does not compete with the order book for liquidity. 
Instead, traders are encouraged to trade upstairs when there is insufficient liquidity and large 
spreads in the order book. 
 
HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING (HFT) AND DIRECTIONS OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
With only a brief examination of the current status of the literature on trading costs, one can 
easily identify that exchanges are currently shaken up by the growth of HFT firms and 
algorithm trading strategies. Iati (2009) approximated that HFT firms that account for 
approximately 2% of the total number of trading firms in the U.S., are responsible for almost 
75% of trading on U.S. markets. HFT firms accounted for 55% of total trading volume in 
2011, up from 26% in 2006 (Source: Bloomberg). A second, more specific definition of HFT 
refers to low-latency trading (see Habrouck, 2010). Hasbrouck (2010) defines latency as “the 
time it takes to observe a market event (e.g., a new bid price in the limit order book), through 
the time it takes to analyze this event and send an order to the exchange that responds to 
the event” Hasbrouck (2010, p.1). Under this definition, low latency strategies refer to 
strategies that are only detectable in the “millisecond environment”. Under these extreme 
trading conditions, trading firms have invested large amounts in technology that would allow 
them to gain execution priority even for a thousandth of a millisecond. Also, the exchanges 
have invested in technology that facilitates HFT as there is a general consensus that HFT 
replaces traditional market makers as providers of liquidity (see Menkveld, 2011). 
Hasbrouck (2010) emphasizes that for HFT to be beneficial for the longer-term 
market investors, the effect of low latency trades will have to be observed by the latter. 
Hence, the author investigates the effect of low latency trades at 10-minute trade intervals 
which are easily observed by longer-term investors.  Hasbrouck (2010) reports that HFT 
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activity is key in reducing effective and quoted spreads and in decreasing short-term 
volatility, even for the down markets of 2008. Hendershott et al. (2011) ask a similar question 
for algorithm trades which resemble high frequency trades nevertheless they can execute at 
much higher latency than the latter. In general, Hendershott et al. (2011) investigate whether 
algorithm trades are mainly suppliers or demanders of liquidity. If algorithm trades are 
suppliers of liquidity, then they effectively help in reducing transaction costs as they operate 
alongside the traditional market makers. If however, algorithm trades are demanders of 
liquidity, then this may result in wider spreads, thereby increasing transaction costs. The 
authors show that algorithm trades have decreased transaction costs, especially for large 
cap stocks, a finding that is mainly attributed to a decrease in the adverse selection 
component of the spread. Hendershott and Riordan (2009) show that the decrease in the 
adverse selection component of the spread is associated with an increase in price discovery. 
The authors show that algorithm trades supply liquidity when markets are expensive and 
demand liquidity when markets are cheap, leading to greater price efficiency. 
O’Hara et al. (2011) further formalize the consequences of HFT. In particular, the 
authors argue that in a high frequency world, clock time is of little importance for the needs 
of capturing informed trading and hence for controlling for the adverse selection transaction 
costs.  This implies that market makers can no longer use order arrival rates to estimate the 
probability of informed trading as high frequency traders bet on tiny margins on a large 
number of trades which cancels the notion of clock time. O’Hara et al. (2011) refer to this 
problem as “flow toxicity”, the tendency of market makers to provide liquidity at a loss. A key 
result from the classification of HFT as toxic trading, is the fact that market makers are 
unable to widen spreads when anticipating a greater liquidity cost.  Easley et al. (2011) show 
that the “flash crash” of May 6th 2010 (which resulted in the biggest one-day point decline in 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average index history) could have been avoided had the market 
makers been able to calculate the increase in flow toxicity prior to the crash. The latest 
finding shows the clear relationship between trading cost and liquidity provision which 
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however may collapse if insecurity (a large adverse selection cost component) prevails in the 
market as it forces market makers to exit the market.  
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examined bid-ask spreads, commissions and other trading costs. Recent 
evidence suggests that trading costs are at historically low levels, which paved the way for 
the implementation of algorithm trading which itself has led to substantial increases in 
trading volumes. Trading costs are classified as commission costs (which are determined by 
the exchange) and the cost components of the bid-ask spread (which are determined by 
market participants acting independently).  
One of the main conclusions of this chapter is that bid-ask spreads can be 
decomposed to order processing, inventory and adverse selection costs which exist 
independently of each other and of commission costs. Evidence has shown that the 43% of 
the quoted spread consists of adverse selection costs, 47% of order processing costs and 
10% of inventory holding costs (Stoll, 1989). It is shown that the variability in trading costs in 
exchanges around the world is a function of the variability in spread components. A recent 
study has shown that the NYSE has the lowest percentage quoted spread (0.20%) amongst 
a sample of 51 developed and emerging market exchanges. Trading costs for emerging 
markets appear to be considerably higher than for the more developed markets, with the 
highest being in Ukraine with average spreads of 15.34%. A second element of variability is 
attributed to differences in market structures. A large portion of this chapter is dedicated to 
the implication of market structure differences in trading costs. It is shown that electronic 
market trading has led to substantial decreases in both commission charges and bid-ask 
spreads, however, off-book trading is praised for the facilitation of large orders.  
Finally, this chapter shows that future research will inevitably focus on the recent 
development of algorithm and high frequency trading. The dominance of high frequency 
trading has led to a deviation from the traditional trading cost measurement tools as high 
frequency traders thrive in low latency trading environments where clock time is of little 
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importance. Current research on this has shown that high frequency trading tends to offer 
liquidity when liquidity is in short supply and demands liquidity when liquidity is abundant in 
the market, ultimately driving down spreads and enhancing the price discovery process. 
Nevertheless, the events of the May 6th 2010 Dow Jones crash are a clear example of the 




1. What are the three components of the bid-ask spread? 
2. Why are block trades important? 
3. In high frequency trading, what is “order flow toxicity” and why is it important? 
4. What are the differences between quoted, effective and realised spreads and price 
impact? 
5. How have trading costs paved the way for the recent substantial increase in trading 
volume?  
REFERENCES 
Ahn, Hee-Joon, Jun Cai and Yan Leung Cheung. 2005."Price clustering on the limit-order 
book: Evidence from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong." Journal of Financial 
Markets 8:4, 421-451. 
Aitken, Michael J., Alex Frino, Amelia M. Hill and Elvis Jar. 2004. "The impact of electronic 
trading on bid-ask spreads: Evidence from futures markets in Hong Kong, London, 
and Sydney." Journal of Futures Markets 24:7, 675–696. 
Amihud, Yakov and Mendelson, Haim. 1980. "Dealership Market: Market Making with 
Uncertainty." Journal of Financial Economics 8:1, 31-54. 
ap Gwilym, Owain, Ian D. McManus and Stephen Thomas. 2005. "Fractional versus decimal 




Bacidore, Jeffrey, Robert H. Battalio and Robert H. Jennings. 2003. "Order submission 
strategies, liquidity supply, and trading in pennies on the New York Stock Exchange." 
Journal of Financial Markets 6:3, 337-362. 
Bagehot, Walter. 1971. "The Only Game in Town." Financial Analysts Journal 27:2, 12-14. 
Ball, Clifford A. and Tarun Chordia. 2001. "True Spreads and Equilibrium Prices." Journal of 
Finance 56:5, 1801-1835. 
Ball, Clifford A., Walter N. Torous and Adrian E. Tschoegl. 1985. "The degree of price 
resolution - the case of the gold market." Journal of Futures Markets 5:1, 29-43. 
Bernhardt, Dan, Vladimir Dvoracek, Eric Hughson and Ingrid M. Werner. 2004. "Why Do 
Larger Orders Receive Discounts on the London Stock Exchange?" Review of 
Financial Studies 18:4, 1343-1368. 
Bessembinder, Hendrik and Kumar Venkataraman. 2004. "Does an electronic stock 
exchange need an upstairs market?" Journal of Financial Economics 73:1, 3-36. 
Bessembinder, Hendrik. 1997. "The degree of price resolution and equity trading costs." 
Journal of Financial Economics 45:1, 9–34. 
Bessembinder, Hendrik. 1999. "Trade Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE: A Post-
Reform Comparison." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 34:3, 387-407. 
Bessembinder, Hendrik. 2003. "Trade Execution Costs and Market Quality after 
Decimalization." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38:4, 747-777. 
Boehmer, Ekkehart. 2005. "Dimensions of execution quality: Recent evidence for U.S. equity 
markets." Journal of Financial Economics 78:3, 463-704. 
Brennan, Michael J., Tarun Chordia and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 1998. "Alternative 
factor specifications,security characteristics, and the cross-section of expected stock 
returns." Journal of Financial Economics 49:3, 345-373. 
Chan, Kalok, Peter Y. Chung and Herb Johnson. 1995. "The Intraday Behavior of Bid-Ask 
Spreads for NYSE Stocks and CBOE Options." Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 30:3, 329-346. 
21 
 
Chiao, Chaoshin and Zi-May Wang. 2009. "Price Clustering: Evidence Using 
Comprehensive Limit-Order Data." The Financial Review 44:1, 1-29. 
Chowdhry, Bhagwan and Vikram Nanda. 1991. "Multimarket trading and market liquidity." 
Review of Financial Studies 4:3 483-511. 
Christie, William G. and Paul H. Schultz. 1994. Why do NASDAQ market makers avoid odd-
eighth quotes? Journal of Finance 49:5, 1813-1840. 
Christie, William G, Harris, Jeffrey H., and Paul H. Schultz. 1994. "Why did NASDAQ market 
makers stop avoiding odd-eighth quotes?" Journal of Finance 49:5, 1841:1860. 
Christie, William G. and Paul H. Schultz. 1999. "The initiation and withdrawal of odd-eighth 
quotes among Nasdaq stocks: an empirical analysis." Journal of Financial 
Economics 52:3, 409–442. 
Chung, Kee H. and Robert A. Van Ness. 2001. "Order handling rules, tick size, and the 
intraday pattern of bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq stocks." Journal of Financial Markets 
4:2, 143-161. 
Chung, Kee H., Bonnie F. Van Ness and Robert A. Van Ness. 2002. "Spreads, Depths, and 
Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and 
Exchange Commission Rule Changes." Financial Review 37:4, 481–505. 
Chung, Kee H., Charlie Charoenwong and David K. Ding. 2004."Penny pricing and the 
components of spread and depth changes." Journal of Banking & Finance 28:12, 
2981-3007. 
Clyde, Paul, Paul Schultz and Mir Zaman. 1997. "Trading Costs and Exchange Delisting: 
The Case of Firms that Voluntarily Move from the American Stock Exchange to the 
Nasdaq." Journal of Finance 52:5, 2103-2112. 
Copeland, Thomas E. and Dan Galai. 1983. "Information Effects and the Bid-Ask Spread." 
Journal of Finance 38:5, 287-305. 




Ding, Liang and Jonas Hiltrop. 2010. "The electronic trading systems and bid-ask spreads in 
the foreign exchange market." Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions 
& Money 20:4, 323–345. 
Dutta, Prajit K. and Madhavan, Ananth. 1997. "Competition and Collusion in Dealer 
Markets." Journal of Finance 52:1, 245-276. 
Easley, David A., Marco M. Lopez de Prado and Maureen O'Hara. 2011.  "The 
Microstructure of the ‘Flash Crash’: Flow Toxicity, Liquidity Crashes, and the 
Probability of Informed Trading."  Journal of Portfolio Management  37:2, 118-128. 
Edmister, Robert O. 1978. "Commission cost structure: Shifts and scale economies." Journal 
of Finance 33:2, 477-486. 
Edmister, Robert O. and N. Subramanian. 1982. "Determinants of brokerage commission 
rates for institutional investors: A note." Journal of Finance 37:4, 1087-1093. 
Foerster, Stephen R. and G. Andrew. Karolyi.  1998. "Multimarket trading and liquidity: a 
transaction data analysis of Canada-US interlistings." Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 8:3-4, 393-412. 
Garman, Mark. 1976. "Market Microstructure." Journal of Financial Economics 3:3, 257-275. 
Glosten, Lawrence R. and Lawrence E. Harris. 1988. "Estimating the components of the 
bid/ask spread." Journal of Financial Economics 21:1, 123-142. 
Glosten, Lawrence R. and Paul R. Milgrom. 1985. "Bid, ask and transaction prices in a 
specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders". Journal of Financial 
Economics 14:1, 71-100. 
Godek, Paul E. 1996. "Why Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes." Journal of 
Financial Economics 41:3, 465–474. 
Goodhart, Charles. and Riccardo Curcio. 1991. "The clustering of bid/ask prices and the 
spread in the foreign exchange market." London School of Economics, Financial 
Market Group, Discussion Paper 110. 
Hansch, Oliver, Narayan Y. Naik and S. Viswanathan. 1999. "Best Execution, Internalization, 
Preferencing and Dealer Profits." Journal of Finance 54:5, 1799-1828. 
23 
 
Harris, Lawrence. 1991. "Stock price clustering and discreteness." Review of Financial 
Studies, 4:3, 389-415. 
Harris, Lawrence. 1999. "Trading in Pennies: A Survey of the Issues." Working Paper, 
University of Southern California. 
Hasbrouck, Joel and Gideon Saar. 2010. "Low-latency trading." Working Paper. New York 
University. 
Hasbrouck, Joel. 1999. "Security bid-ask dynamics with discreteness and clustering: Simple 
strategies for modelling and estimation." Journal of Financial Markets 2:1, 1-28. 
Heidle, Hans G. and Roger D. Huang. 2002. "Information-Based Trading in Dealer and 
Auction Markets: An Analysis of Exchange Listings." Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 37:3, 391-424. 
Hendershott, Terrence, and Ryan Riordan. 2009. "Algorithmic Trading and Information." 
NET Institute Working Paper No. 09–08. 
Hendershott, Terrence, Charles M. Jones, and Albert J. Menkveld. 2011. "Does Algorithmic 
Trading Improve Liquidity?" Journal of Finance 66:1–33. 
Ho, Thomas and Hans R. Stoll. 1981. "Optimal Dealer Pricing under Transactions and 
Returns Uncertainty." Journal of Financial Economics 9:1, 47-73. 
Ho, Thomas and Hans R. Stoll. 1983. "On Dealer Markets Under Competition", Journal of 
Finance 35:2, 259-267. 
Huang, Roger D and Hans R. Stoll. 1997. "The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A 
General Approach." Review of Financial Studies 10:4, 995-1034.  
Huang, Roger D. and Hans R. Stoll. 1996. "Dealer versus auction markets: A paired 
comparison of execution costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE." Journal of Financial 
Economics 41:3, 313-357. 
Huang, Roger D. and Hans R. Stoll. 2001.  "Tick Size, Bid-Ask Spreads, and Market 
Structure."  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 36:4, 503-522. 
Huang, Yu Chuan. 2004. "The components of bid-ask spread and their determinants: 
TAIFEX versus SGX-DT." Journal of Futures Markets 24:9, 835–860. 
24 
 
Iati, Robert. 2009. “High Frequency Trading Technology." TABB Group. 
Jaffee, Jeff and Robert Winkler. 1976. "Optimal Speculation against an Efficient Market." 
Journal of Finance 31:1, 49-61. 
Jain, Pankaj K. 2003. "Institutional Design and Liquidity at Stock Exchanges around the 
World." working paper, University of Memphis. 
Jones, Charles M. 2002. "A century of stock market liquidity and trading costs." Working 
paper, Columbia University. 
Jones, Charles M., and Marc L. Lipson. 2001. "Sixteenths: direct evidence on institutional 
execution costs." Journal of Financial Economics 59:2, 253-278. 
Kandel, Eugene and Leslie M. Marx. 1997. "Nasdaq market structure and spread patterns." 
Journal of Financial Economics 45:1, 61-89. 
Keim, Donald B. and Ananth Madhavan. 1997. "Transactions costs and investment style: an 
interexchange analysis of institutional equity trades." Journal of Financial Economics 
46:3, 293-319. 
Logue, Dennis. 1975. "Market-Making and the Assessment of Market Efficiency." Journal of 
Finance 30:1, 115-23. 
Madhavan, Ananth and Seymour Smidt. 1991. "A Bayesian model of intraday specialist 
pricing." Journal of Financial Economics 30:1, 99-134. 
Madhavan, Ananth. 2000. "Market microstructure." Journal of Financial Markets 3:3, 205-
258. 
Menkveld, Albert J. 2011. "High frequency trading and the new market makers." Working 
Paper. VU University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, and Duisenberg School of 
Finance. 
NYSE. 2001. "Comparing bid-ask spreads on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ 
immediately following NASDAQ decimalisation." NYSE Research. 
O'Hara, Maureen and George S. Oldfield. 1986. "The microeconomics of market making." 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21:04, 361-376. 
25 
 
O'Hara, Maureen, David A. Easley and Marcos M. Lopez de Prado. (forthcoming).  "Flow 
Toxicity and Liquidity in a High Frequency World."  Review of Financial Studies. 
Roll, Richard. 1984. "A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an 
Efficient Market." Journal of Finance 39:4, 1127-1139. 
Seppi, Duane J. 1990. "Equilibrium Block Trading and Asymmetric Information." Journal of 
Finance 45:1, 73-94. 
Simaan, Yusif, Daniel G. Weaver and David K. Whitcomb. 2003. "Market Maker Quotation 
Behavior and Pretrade Transparency." Journal of Finance 58:3, 1247–1268. 
Smidt, Seymour. 1971. "Which Road to an Efficient Stock Market: Free Competition or 
Regulated Monopoly?" Financial Analysts Journal 27:5, 18-68. 
Smith, Brian F. 2001. "Upstairs Market for Principal and Agency Trades: Analysis of Adverse 
Information and Price Effects." Journal of Finance 56:5, 1723-1746. 
Stoll, Hans R. 1978. "The Supply of Dealer Services in Securities Markets." Journal of 
Finance 33:4, 1133-1151. 
Stoll, Hans R. 1989. "Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical 
Tests." Journal of Finance 44:1, 115-34. 
Stoll, Hans R. 2006. "Electronic Trading in Stock Markets."  The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 20:1, 153-174. 
Tse, Yiuman and Tatyana V. Zabotina. 2001. "Transaction Costs and Market Quality: Open 
Outcry Versus Electronic Trading." Journal of Futures Markets 21:8, 713–735. 
Venkataraman, Kumar. 2001. "Automated versus Floor Trading: An Analysis of Execution 
Costs on the Paris and New York Exchanges." Journal of Finance 56:4, 1445-1485. 
William G. Christie and Roger D. Huang.  1994. "Market Structures and Liquidity: A 
Transactions Data Study of Exchange Listings." Journal of Financial Intermediation 
3:3, 300-326. 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
26 
 
Thanos Verousis is a Lecturer in Finance at Bangor Business School, Bangor University, 
UK. Thanos' research interests broadly lie in the microstructure of financial markets, 
however his main contribution is on the microstructure of individual equity options trading at 
NYSE LIFFE. He has also conducted research in the area of micro analysis of agent 
behaviour in financial markets and in the liquidity aspects of investment trusts. His work has 
appeared at the Journal of Futures Markets, the European Journal of Finance and the 
International Review of Financial Analysis. Dr Verousis has also taught at Swansea 
University and holds a PhD in Financial Markets from the University of Wales. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
The author would like to thank Timotheos Angelidis and Owain ap Gwilym for their valuable 



















CHAPTER 20 BID-ASK SPREADS, COMMISSIONS AND OTHER COSTS 
 
1. What are the three components of the bid-ask spread? 
The order processing cost component is referred to as the “price of immediacy” and 
traces its origins to the problem of simultaneity in buying and selling securities. A trader 
wishing to buy (sell) an asset has no guarantee that a seller (buyer) will be readily 
available in the market to provide this service, hence traders will only agree to provide 
this service if they are compensated. The bid-ask spread reflects the premium for 
providing this service. The inventory cost component arises from short-term order 
imbalances as dealers adjust their spreads in order to maximize profits and fulfil their 
requirement as providers of liquidity. The adverse selection component of the spread 
arises as dealers widen their spread in order to be compensated from trading with 
informed traders.  
2. Why are block trades important? How do exchanges deal with block trades? 
Block trades are important because of the potential price impact that they carry and 
because they tend to be more informative than the smaller, retail trades. In the US, untill 
1974, the commission charge on block trades was relative to commission charges to 
smaller trades, however, after 1974, block trades started receiving large discounts. 
Exchanges facilitate large orders via off-book trading floors that reduce execution costs 
and increase trade transparency. These discounts largely come from tapping into hidden 
liquidity pools, a feature which would have been impossible had the block trade been 
executed in the order book market. 
3. In high frequency trading, what is “order flow toxicity”? 
The term “order flow toxicity” refers to the tendency of market makers to provide 
liquidity at a loss. The problem of “order flow toxicity” arises as a consequence of high 
frequency trading where market makers can no longer use order arrival rates to estimate 
the probability of informed trading as high frequency trades bet on tiny margins on a 
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large number of trades which cancels the notion of clock time. In market microstructure, 
“order flow toxicity” is important as the presence of “toxic” orders may potentially drive 
market makers out of the market. The “flash crash” of May 6th 2010 is a good example 
of the potential consequences of “order flow toxicity”. 
4. What are the differences between quoted, effective and realised spreads and price 
impact? 
The simplest measure of implied execution costs is the quoted spread, which is 
usually denoted in percentage basis points. The quoted spread of a stock is calculated 
as the difference between ask and bid prices at a given point in time divided by the quote 
midpoint (which is the average of the ask and bid price at the same time). Quoted 
spreads are only implicit measures of execution costs, as they do not refer to the actual 
traded price. Effective bid-ask spreads are estimated as the absolute percentage 
difference between the traded price and the quote midpoint. In markets where trade 
negotiations are allowed, the effective spread also reflects trade improvements as 
traders are permitted to trade “inside” the quotes, hence the effective spread tends to be 
lower than the quoted spread. Price impacts measure adverse selection costs, that is the 
costs of trading with an informed trader and are estimated as the percentage difference 
between the midquote that prevailed at the time of the trade and a future midquote. The 
realised spread is estimated as the difference between the effective spread and price 
impact. As the realised spread is net of the price impact, it reflects trading costs net of 
any losses to informed traders.   
5. How have changes in trading costs paved the way for the recent substantial increase in 
trading volume?  
First, technological advances with the increased use of electronic trading have 
substantially reduced the cost of handling orders by broker-dealers. Studies have shown 
that the average round-trip commission has fallen substantially over the recent years. 
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Second, the implementation of high frequency trading strategies relies on heavy volume 
to extract marginal profits from a very large number of trades. In 2009, HFT firms 
accounted for approximately 2% of the total number of trading firms, however they were 
responsible for almost 75% of the total trading volume in the U.S., approximately a 
threefold increase from 2006. The decrease in trading costs has made the 
implementation of these strategies possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
